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NATO, CYBER DEFENSE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
David P. Fidler* 
Richard Pregent** 
Alex Vandurme*** 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
Cybersecurity threats pose challenges to individuals, 
corporations, states, and intergovernmental organizations.  The 
emergence of these threats also presents international cooperation 
on security with difficult tasks.  This essay analyzes how 
cybersecurity threats affect the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), which is arguably the most important collective defense 
alliance in the world.1  NATO has responded to the cyber threat in 
policy and operational terms (Part I), but approaches and shifts in 
cybersecurity policies create problems for NATO—problems that 
NATO principles, practices, and politics exacerbate in ways that 
will force NATO to address cyber threats more aggressively than it 
has done so far  (Part II).  Whether NATO can adapt its approach 
before a major cybersecurity crisis affects the Alliance’s ability to 
carry out its missions effectively remains, at the present time, in 
doubt. 
 
 
 
                                                
* James Louis Calamaras Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School 
of Law; and Senior Fellow, Indiana University Center on Applied Cybersecurity 
Research. 
** Legal Advisor, NATO Allied Command Counterintelligence. 
*** Head, Technical Center Engineering, NATO Computer Incident Response 
Capability. 
1 This essay integrates the three panel presentations focused on NATO at the St. 
John’s University School of Law Symposium on “Cyberconflict: Threats, 
Responses, and the Role of Law” held April 12, 2013, namely: “NATO Cyber 
Defence: An Operational Perspective” (Alex Vandurme), “Cyber Operations 
and Collective Self-Defense” (Richard Pregent), and “NATO, Cybersecurity, 
and International Law” (David P. Fidler). The analysis and views in this essay 
are individual perspectives and opinions only and do not represent the official 
policies or positions of NATO or any NATO member.  
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I. NATO AND NATO CYBER DEFENSE 
 
A. NATO: History, Evolution, and Emergence of the Cyber 
Threat2 
 
Understanding NATO’s responses to cyber threats requires 
some background in NATO’s history and evolution. Established in 
1949, NATO emerged out of the geopolitical turmoil of the late 
1940s that featured military and political threats from the Soviet 
Union against Western European nations, many of which World 
War II had devastated and left vulnerable to external attack, 
foreign-sponsored subversion, or revival of nationalistic 
militarism.3  The twelve founding NATO members created a 
cooperative security organization premised on a commitment to 
collective defense—an armed attack against any NATO member 
would be an attack against all members, triggering the rights of 
individual and collective self-defense under which NATO would 
respond collectively to the attack, including, if necessary, with the 
use of armed force.4 
Once established, NATO became a core commitment and 
institution in the West’s efforts to establish and maintain peace in 
Western Europe and confront, compete with, deter, and, if 
necessary, defeat the Soviet Union and its allies. NATO’s role in 
the West’s strategy to defend against the Soviet threat required 
building effective political decision-making processes and military 
capabilities.  Under the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO members 
created the North Atlantic Council as the pre-eminent political 
body and the military infrastructure necessary to implement 
Council decisions and defend the Alliance from military threats 
posed by the Soviet Union, and, after 1955, the Warsaw Pact.5  
NATO expanded to include Greece and Turkey in 1952 and West 
Germany in 1955 as key participants in its collective defense 
efforts. 
                                                
2 This section is based primarily on Richard Pregent’s Symposium presentation, 
“Cyber Operations and Collective Self-Defense.” 
3 See, e.g., NATO, A Short History of NATO, http://www.nato.int/history/nato-
history.html (last visited June 13, 2013). 
4 North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246. 
5 Id. at art. 9. 
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As an alliance of many countries, NATO operated on the 
basis of fundamental principles and understandings.  NATO’s 
focus was on defending its members from military attack, which 
meant that NATO did not function “out of area” despite the global 
scale of the West’s competition with the Soviet bloc.  Politically, 
NATO made decisions on the basis of consensus, meaning all 
members agreed on (or did not oppose) steps NATO needed to 
take to meet its objectives. Making and implementing NATO 
decisions often revealed political or legal constraints NATO 
members had domestically that affected NATO policies. In terms 
of military and other capabilities, NATO had what its members 
provided in terms of funding, armed forces, and weaponry. 
 Despite challenges and crises during the Cold War, NATO 
maintained its central role in the West’s confrontation with the 
Soviet Union.  The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s presented NATO 
with questions about its purpose in a post-Cold War world. Rather 
than disband, NATO expanded its membership (now at 28 
nations),6 began to engage in “out of area” security and military 
operations (e.g., in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Libya), and started working more broadly with 
non-NATO countries through partnerships. NATO also adapted to 
address new security threats, such as international terrorism after 
9/11, piracy off the Horn of Africa, and cyber attacks, especially 
after the cyber attacks Estonia, a post-Cold War NATO member, 
experienced in 2007.7 
 Although NATO’s evolution in the post-Cold War period 
has involved NATO moving away from its classical collective self-
defense mission and into new geographical contexts and security 
threats, the emergence of cybersecurity threats re-highlighted 
NATO’s collective defense mission because of challenges to the 
Alliance and its members created by societal, governmental, and 
intergovernmental dependence on new information technologies, 
especially the Internet.  However, cyber threats constitute a 
different collective defense problem than deterring Soviet tanks 
from charging through the Fulda Gap.  
                                                
6 NATO, NATO Member Countries, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ 
natolive/nato_countries.htm (last updated Apr. 9, 2013).  
7 On the Estonian cyber attacks, see ENEKEN TIKK, KADRI KASKA & LIIS VIHUL, 
INTERNATIONAL CYBER INCIDENTS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 14−34 (2010). 
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 With the Internet’s global reach and the interconnectedness 
of every NATO member with cyberspace, conceiving of cyber 
threats to NATO as “in area” or “out of area” makes little sense.  
In the cyber context, collective self-defense in NATO plays out on 
a global scale vis-á-vis state and non-state actors. As described 
below, NATO’s responses to the cyber threat have required 
adapting the core mission of collective defense to a threat that 
defies analogies to, or precedents from, NATO’s past.  
 
B. NATO Cyber Defense: The Policy Commitment 
 
Although the watershed moment for NATO cyber defense 
was the cyber attacks Estonia suffered in 2007, NATO started to 
address cyber threats before this event.  During the Kosovo 
operation in 1999, NATO members and military forces 
experienced crude cyber attacks, involving denial of service 
attacks and webpage defacements.8  These incidents did not 
adversely affect NATO operations in Kosovo, but they occurred at 
a time when political and military concerns about cybersecurity 
were growing.9 In 2002, the NATO summit in Prague identified 
the need for NATO to strengthen its capabilities to defend against 
cyber attacks and established the Cyber Defence Program.10  This 
Program created the NATO Computer Incident Response 
Capability (NCIRC) in order to provide NATO with better 
capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to cyber threats.11  In 
2005, NATO included the cyber threat in the Comprehensive 
Political Guidance document12 and reinforced the need to protect 
                                                
8 Jason Healey & Leendert van Bochoven, Atlantic Council, NATO’s Cyber 
Capabilities: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, at 2 (Feb. 2012), available at 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/natos-cyber-
capabilities-yesterday-today-and-tomorrow. 
9 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Def., An Assessment of International Legal Issues in 
Information Operations, at 5 (May 1999) (observing that “the proliferation of 
global electronic communication systems and the increased interoperability of 
computer equipment and operating systems . . . have made information systems 
that are connected to any kind of network . . . vulnerable to computer network 
attacks”). 
10 NATO, NATO and Cyber Defence, http://www.nato.int/ 
cps/en/natolive/topics_78170.htm? (last updated Oct. 22, 2013) [hereinafter 
NATO and Cyber Defence]. 
11 Healey & Bochoven, supra note 8, at 2. 
12 Id. 
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NATO information systems at the Riga summit,13 indicating that 
NATO’s interest in cybersecurity reflected mounting worries about 
social, political, and military vulnerabilities the deepening 
dependence on cyberspace was creating.  
 Even though NATO started to respond to cyber threats 
earlier, the cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007 revealed the 
inadequacy of NATO’s activities and sparked a significant scaling 
up of NATO political commitment and operational capabilities in 
this area.  The Estonian incident helped bring the stakes of cyber 
threats into sharper perspective for NATO.14  Cyber threats 
presented challenges to NATO’s image and reputation, its ability 
to ensure secure communications supporting military operations 
conducted by the Alliance, its capabilities to function effectively 
when cyberspace represents a new battlefield or domain of military 
conflict, and the ability of NATO members to contribute to the 
Alliance’s objectives and missions.  
 The increased policy commitment can be seen in the 
outcome of the Bucharest summit in 2008, at which NATO 
members noted their adoption of a Policy on Cyber Defence, 
which stressed “the need for NATO and nations to protect key 
information systems; to share best practices; and to provide a 
capability to assist Allied nations, upon request, to counter a cyber 
attack.”15  NATO continued to give prominence to cyber defense 
in its Strategic Concept16 adopted at the Lisbon summit (2010),17 
                                                
13 NATO and Cyber Defence, supra note 10. 
14 Stéphane Abrial, NATO Builds Its Cyberdefenses, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com-/2011/02/28/opinion/28iht-edabrial28.html?_r=1&# 
(commander of NATO’s Allied Command Transformation observing that the 
damage caused by the cyber attacks on Estonia “was a wake-up call for 
NATO”). 
15 NATO, Bucharest Summit Declaration para. 47 (Apr. 3, 2008), 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts-_8443.htm. 
16 NATO, Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the 
Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
at 16 (Nov. 2010), http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/ 
20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf [hereinafter NATO Strategic 
Concept] (highlighting the need for NATO to “develop further our ability to 
prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks”). 
17 NATO, Lisbon Summit Declaration para. 2 (Nov. 20, 2010), 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_11/2010_11_11DE1DB9B
73C4F9BBFB52B2C94722EAC_PR_CP_2010_0155_ENG-
Summit_LISBON.pdf. 
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the Cyber Defense Concept, Policy, and Action Plan (2011),18 and 
the Chicago summit declaration (2012).19 
 Through these policy developments, NATO has 
established, or encouraged the creation of, mechanisms to 
implement, with the NCIRC, the strategy of improving cyber 
defense within the Alliance and in NATO members, including the: 
 
• Cyber Defence Management Board (CDMB), which is 
the main NATO body overseeing NATO cyber defense 
activities;20 
• Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD 
COE) in Tallinn, Estonia, as a research and educational 
enterprise not formally part of NATO but supported by 
NATO members that collaborates with NATO on cyber 
defense issues;21  
• Meetings of NATO Defence Ministers dedicated to cyber 
defense;22 and 
• Holding cyber defense exercises with NATO members.23 
  
NATO also integrated cyber defense into existing policy 
processes.  The Cyber Defence Concept, Policy, and Action Plan 
of 2011 connects the cyber defense effort overseen by the CDMB 
with the Defence Policy and Planning Committee in Reinforced 
Format (DPPC(R)) established in 2010, which manages NATO’s 
planning processes.24  NATO has also made more transparent the 
                                                
18 NATO, Defending the Networks: The NATO Policy on Cyber Defence (2011), 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_09/20111004_110914-
policy-cyberdefence.pdf [hereinafter NATO Policy on Cyber Defence]. 
19 NATO, Chicago Summit Declaration para. 49 (May 20, 2012), 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official-_texts_87593.htm?mode= 
pressrelease. 
20 NATO and Cyber Defence, supra note 10. 
21 NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 
https://www.ccdcoe.org (last visited Sept. 8, 2013). 
22 NATO, Defence Ministers Make Progress on Cyber Protection, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news-_101143.htm (last updated Jun. 4, 
2013). 
23 NATO, Exercising Together Against Cyber Attacks, http://www.nato.int/ 
cps/en/natolive/75747.htm (last updated Oct. 9, 2012). 
24 NATO, The NATO Defence Planning Process, http://www.nato.int/ 
cps/en/SID-F7C21EDE-DEEA4EA7/natolive/topics_49202.htm (last updated 
May 18, 2012). 
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process through which NATO will make decisions on cyber threats 
that might implicate collective defense under the North Atlantic 
Treaty.  In essence, NCIRC will notify the CDMB of threats it has 
identified that might raise collective defense concerns, and CDMB 
will inform and work with the DPPC(R) if threats warrant higher-
level involvement.  The North Atlantic Council retains the 
authority to declare whether a cyber attack constitutes an “armed 
attack” under the North Atlantic Treaty.  See Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. NATO Cyber Defense Governance 
 
 
Source: NATO25 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
25 NATO Policy on Cyber Defence, supra note 18, at 1. 
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C. NATO Cyber Defense: An Operational Perspective26 
 
1. NATO’s cyber threat landscape 
 
NCIRC is NATO’s main source of technical and 
operational expertise and capabilities in cyber defense.  It works to 
protect NATO entities (e.g., NATO headquarters) and missions 
(e.g., International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 
Afghanistan) and to help NATO members address cybersecurity 
threats to their information technology systems.  The diversity of 
these tasks creates different challenges for NCIRC.  For example, 
ensuring information security in NATO military operations 
requires balancing operational needs for speed, secrecy, and 
mobility with risk management, data security, and information 
sharing—all tasks that characterize effective cybersecurity. 
Working in other areas, such as protecting the everyday 
functioning of NATO information systems from infiltration, 
creates other demands on NCIRC. 
 NATO confronts a cyber threat landscape that involves 
generic and specific threats NCIRC has to address.  The generic 
threats include malware, such as viruses and worms, that circulate 
globally and are often designed by cyber criminals to steal 
information or money.  NATO systems encounter such malware, 
even when it is not intentionally aimed at NATO or its personnel. 
However, NATO is the target of a range of cyber intrusion 
attempts, including those perpetrated by organized criminal 
organizations, foreign governments engaging in cyber espionage, 
and “hacktivists” opposed to NATO policies or activities.  NATO 
also has to deal with issues related to its personnel whose on-line 
behaviors sometimes create risks for the integrity of NATO 
information systems. 
 Cyber criminals and foreign governments target NATO 
systems by using sophisticated email messages that appear credible 
and authentic to the recipient.  However, these emails include 
“trojan horse” malware that—if activated by the recipient, for 
example, by clicking on an attachment—attempts to gain access to 
NATO computers, upload documents, collect information (e.g., 
passwords, network architecture), use infected computers to 
                                                
26 This section is based on Alex Vandurme’s Symposium presentation on 
“NATO Cyber Defence: An Operational Perspective.” 
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compromise other machines and networks, and download more 
malware (e.g., more advanced programs for exfiltrating 
information). NATO is an espionage target for foreign 
governments because of its importance as one of the world’s pre-
eminent security alliances, and NATO makes a tempting target for 
cyber criminals because, among other reasons, they can sell 
information they steal from NATO to a range of willing buyers, 
including governments. 
 The hacktivist threat to NATO has emerged more recently, 
with hacktivism aimed at NATO becoming more prominent toward 
the end of 2011 and continuing through 2012.  Among the 
hacktivists targeting NATO, perhaps the most well-known has 
been Anonymous, a global, shadowy collection of like-minded 
(and very smart) hackers who coordinate their activities for 
maximum impact.  Hacktivists seek publicity through damaging 
NATO’s image and reputation, so NATO has experienced 
webpage-defacement attacks, both successful and unsuccessful. 
 NATO also has to deal with cybersecurity problems created 
by “insiders”—NATO personnel whose behaviors, both intentional 
and unintentional, generate threats and risks to NATO information 
systems.  Targeted email attacks, as described above, rely on 
recipients to click on attachments or other embedded code, and, 
unfortunately, just like any other organization, NATO personnel 
click on things they should not, which means NCIRC has to 
address threats created by such actions.  Even though NATO’s 
systems for storing and sharing classified information are not 
connected to the Internet, NCIRC has documented NATO 
personnel attempting to transmit classified information by email 
over the Internet—behavior that puts NATO security, and 
sometimes NATO forces, at risk.  
 
2. NCIRC’s approach to cyber defense 
 
NCIRC addresses the cyber threats NATO faces through an 
integrated approach that stresses prevention of threats, detection of 
intrusions, response to incidents, recovery from infiltrations, and 
applying lessons learned through feedback into prevention, 
detection, response, and recovery strategies (Figure 2).  In each 
aspect of this approach, NCIRC continues to develop capabilities 
and services to improve NATO’s cyber defense. 
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Figure 2. NCIRC’s Methodology 
 
 
 
 In terms of prevention, NCIRC emphasizes secure 
engineering of information systems to “harden the target” in order 
to reduce potential vulnerabilities—or the “attack surface”—and 
provides continuous, NATO-wide anti-malware support. NCIRC 
strengthens prevention through (1) assessing the vulnerability of 
NATO systems, including penetration testing, as part of risk 
assessment and management; and (2) improving NATO personnel 
awareness through training, exercises, educational materials, and 
notifications.  
 NCIRC monitors NATO systems to detect intrusions, 
including checking emails for malware and web sites for 
infiltrations.  Detection leads to intrusion analysis to determine the 
nature and scale of a threat and inform responses to it. NCIRC 
continues to improve its ability to respond to cyber incidents, 
including (1) expanding its currently limited 24/7 response 
capability and computer forensic services; and (2) developing a 
rapid reaction team to mobilize against serious incidents, such as 
those Estonia experienced in 2007.  NCIRC provides on-line and 
on-site recovery support services and post-incident verification of 
recovery in order to minimize the adverse effects of cyber 
intrusions.  Prevention, detection, response, and recovery activities 
produce information NCIRC analyzes into order to develop and 
share “lessons learned,” identify trends, and build a more informed 
picture of NATO’s cyber defense efforts and security posture. 
 NCIRC’s operations demand extensive and intensive 
collaboration within the Alliance (e.g., between NATO agencies 
Prevent	  
Detect	  
Respond	  Recover	  
Feedback	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and member nations) and with non-NATO partner countries, 
intergovernmental organizations (e.g., the European Union), 
national law enforcement authorities, private industry, and 
academia.  Further, the more robust NCIRC’s operational 
capabilities become, the more collaboration is critical for NATO 
cyber defense.  
 
 
II. NATO CYBER DEFENSE, CYBERSECURITY POLICY TRENDS,  
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW27 
 
The establishment and strengthening of NCIRC’s 
operational capabilities for cyber defense demonstrates that the 
cyber threat to NATO is a clear, present, and growing danger.  As 
important as such capabilities are, NATO cyber defense takes 
place in a context affected by policy and legal considerations.  This 
part of the essay analyzes NATO cyber defense efforts against 
trends in cybersecurity policy and the legal implications of these 
trends, especially the international legal implications.  This 
analysis situates NATO cyber defense in the broader context of 
cybersecurity policy developments and international legal 
challenges that policy makers face.  The analysis also raises 
questions about NATO cyber defense in the future, including 
questions that identify obstacles to NATO’s ability to improve 
cyber defense sufficiently in light of mounting cybersecurity 
threats. 
 
A. General Breakdown of Cybersecurity Policy Approaches 
 
Stepping back from NATO, we need to acknowledge that 
efforts to address cyber threats have created different policy 
pathways.  Three pathways have become prominent—the cyber 
threat, cyber defense, and cyber technology approaches (Figure 3).  
Although these approaches are not mutually exclusive, they are 
distinct.  Under the cyber threat approach, we classify a specific 
cyber threat into traditional policy categories, namely armed 
conflict, espionage, terrorism, or crime.  These categories have 
policy prescriptions and legal rules that we apply to the cyber 
                                                
27 This part is based on David P. Fidler’s Symposium presentation on “NATO, 
Cybersecurity, and International Law.” 
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threat in question, and the categories are defined in ways that are 
not technology specific. 
Despite the prominence of the cyber threat approach, 
concerns exist that it does not, and cannot, provide robust 
cybersecurity.  Classifying cyber threats into traditional categories 
does little, the critique goes, for preventing attacks and building 
resilience against attacks prevention activities do not stop.  Instead, 
the cyber defense approach counsels cybersecurity policy to 
concentrate on defending against threats regardless of their source 
or characterization under existing policy and legal categories.  This 
approach is an “all hazards” strategy advising prevention of threats 
and resilience in responding to and recovering from threats that get 
through. In other words, effective cybersecurity through prevention 
and resilience does not depend on classifying a threat as an act of 
war, espionage, terrorism, or crime or knowing a threat’s source.  
 However, the cyber defense approach faces criticism as 
well, typically that an emphasis on defense is inadequate to deliver 
sustainable cybersecurity.  Cyber threats have developed to the 
point where policy has to focus on not only defensive measures but 
also capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defeat adversaries.  This 
emphasis on such full-spectrum capabilities characterizes the cyber 
technology approach, which stresses that cybersecurity is 
ultimately about having technological capabilities to defend 
against, deter, and defeat cyber threats and those responsible for 
them.  Under this approach, technological capabilities for offensive 
as well as defensive activities must form part of cybersecurity 
policy. 
 
Figure 3. Cybersecurity Policy Breakdown 
 
13                   ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL     [Vol. 4, No. 1 
                                            & COMPARATIVE LAW 
 
B. Cybersecurity Policy Approaches, International Law, and 
NATO 
 
1. NATO’s commitment to law and NATO’s legal ecosystem 
 
NATO’s emphasis on cyber defense across its missions is 
embedded within a broader Alliance commitment to legal 
principles and the rule of law.  NATO’s Strategic Concept 
captured this sentiment in stating that NATO constitutes “a unique 
community of values, committed to the principle of individual 
liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law” and that 
NATO will act “[a]lways in accordance with international law.”28  
 Applied to cyber defense, this commitment to law means 
that legal challenges NATO faces in this realm will be many and 
complex.  NATO faces these challenges in a complicated legal 
ecosystem composed of national law, transnational law applicable 
to NATO members which are European Union (EU) members, and 
international law.  NATO cyber defense activities have to navigate 
this legal ecosystem to find approaches that produce legal 
convergence or harmonization among NATO members.  Strategies 
that conflict with, or raise questions under, national, EU, or 
international law will reveal—or create—legal divergence or 
fragmentation within the Alliance.  Given that cybersecurity 
presents challenges to national, EU, and international law 
regardless of NATO’s activities, legal issues are important features 
of NATO’s efforts on cyber defense—a reality recognized by CCD 
COE’s work on legal questions related to cybersecurity.29 
 
 
2. Law and the cyber threat approach: Struggling with lex 
lata 
 
As described above, the cyber threat approach classifies 
incidents into existing policy and legal categories, which means 
that this approach operates on the basis of a significant body of 
national and international law.  The classification process involves, 
first, determining whether a state or non-state actor perpetrated a 
                                                
28 NATO Strategic Concept, supra note 16, at 6, 7. 
29 NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, Focus Areas, 
https://www.ccdcoe.org/37.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2013). 
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cyber incident and, second, slotting the incident into a specific 
category that contains the policy and legal guidance for addressing 
it (Figure 4).  In terms of the first step, international legal 
principles are important in assigning responsibility for cyber 
incidents.  The international law on state responsibility affects 
whether and how a state victimized by a cyber attack can attribute 
it to another state actor.  For attribution and non-state actors, 
international law on human rights includes principles that regulate 
the application of criminal law against terrorists or ordinary 
criminals. 
 The second step requires classifying an incident according 
to long-standing policy and legal categories—for state actions, 
armed conflict or espionage (both traditional and economic 
espionage); for non-state actors, terrorism and crime. Each 
category contains international law governing responses to 
incidents that fall within it.  For armed conflict, jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello apply.  International law is permissive with respect to 
espionage, even when countries criminalize espionage in national 
law.  States have adopted treaties to address terrorism, and 
international law includes both generic instruments on crime (e.g., 
extradition treaties; mutual legal assistance treaties) and treaties 
addressing specific international crimes (e.g., torture, genocide, 
crimes against humanity).  Overall, the cyber threat approach 
implicates a great deal of existing international law. 
 
Figure 4. Cyber Threat Approach 
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However, much of the international law implicated is not 
specific to the cyber threat but involves “legacy rules” developed 
before cybersecurity challenges emerged.30  The only category in 
which cyber-specific international legal rules exist is in the 
criminal realm, where, for example, the Council of Europe has 
produced the Convention on Cybercrime.31  Cybersecurity policy 
debates have addressed whether international legal rules not 
specific to cyber threats are adequate or insufficient.  In terms of 
armed conflict, the recently published Tallinn Manual on 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare contributes to this 
debate by systematically applying the existing law of armed 
conflict to cyber means and methods of warfare.32  The 
permissiveness of international law on espionage has come under 
heightened scrutiny as the problem of economic cyber espionage 
has escalated.33  Although no acts of cyber terrorism have 
occurred, none of the existing anti-terrorism treaties would apply 
effectively to such acts.  For countries that are not state parties to 
the Convention on Cybercrime, they can use more all-purpose 
bilateral extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties to 
cooperate on cyber crime, but using these treaties effectively 
against cyber crime faces numerous difficulties.  
 More pointedly, whether the cyber threat approach, 
including the laws it implicates, can support an effective strategy is 
unclear.  The approach is mainly a reactive one—a cyber incident 
happens, it must be discovered and classified to identify what laws 
apply, and then the applicable laws have to be implemented against 
the perpetrators, assuming the incident can be technically 
attributed to a specific actor in a manner that supports imposing 
legal responsibility.  The experience of the Convention on 
                                                
30 Applying laws developed before the emergence of cyber threats to such 
threats is also sometimes called applying “law by analogy.” See, e.g., Duncan B. 
Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations, 11 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV, 1023, 1029 (2007) (questioning the “law-by-analogy 
approach to government cyberoperations”). 
31 Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, ETS No. 185, 2296 U.N.T.S. 167. 
32 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., Cambridge University Press 2013) 
[hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL].   
33 See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE, DEF. SECURITY SERVICE, ADMINISTRATION 
STRATEGY ON MITIGATING THE THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS 1 (2013). 
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Cybercrime, which has only been ratified by 39 states,34 suggests 
that moving from legacy rules to cyber-specific principles is not an 
adequate response in a number of ways, including that it does not 
change the reactive nature of the cyber threat approach or provide 
effective deterrence against state and non-state use of cyber 
technologies for various purposes.  
 Despite problems connected with the cyber threat approach, 
it remains part of cybersecurity policy and law nationally and 
internationally, even where the law applied consists only of legacy 
rules.  Thus, it is relevant for thinking about NATO cyber defense. 
As a collective defense organization, how international law on 
armed conflict applies to cyber threats is critical.  The NATO-
affiliated CCD COE facilitated the development of the Tallinn 
Manual given the importance of these international legal 
questions.35  Even though the Tallinn Manual is not an official 
NATO document, statement of NATO policy, or the reflection of 
any NATO member’s position, it will be a seminal analysis in 
terms of how NATO and NATO members think about and apply 
the international law on armed conflict to cyber means and 
methods of warfare.  
 As described earlier, NATO is a target of foreign 
governments engaging in cyber espionage, and NATO faces this 
threat in a context in which international law does not prohibit or 
restrict espionage activities.  Does the threat of cyber espionage, 
including economic cyber espionage, suggest that NATO and its 
members should re-think the permissive nature of international law 
on espionage?  More specifically, how will NATO and NATO 
members respond to U.S. diplomatic efforts to change attitudes and 
practices on economic espionage in light of revelations of alleged 
Chinese economic cyber espionage on a massive scale?36  
 Part of NATO’s post-Cold War evolution involved 
addressing as an Alliance the threat of international terrorism,37 
                                                
34 Convention on Cybercrime (June 13, 2013), C.E.T.S. 185, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm. 
35 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 32, at 1. 
36 See WHITE HOUSE, supra note 33. 
37 NATO, NATO and the Fight Against Terrorism, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ 
SID-8E7AA87D-4AEBB4C6/natolive/76706.htm (last updated Oct. 12, 2012). 
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and NATO members have widely ratified anti-terrorism treaties.38  
With mounting indications, especially from the United States,39 
that counter-terrorism is beginning a transformation from the 
policies that have characterized the post-9/11 world, NATO faces 
questions about how it will coordinate its cyber defense activities 
with its on-going (and probably shifting) counter-terrorism efforts.  
What this transformation in counter-terrorism will be is still not 
entirely clear, but it will probably involve addressing terrorist 
activities less from an armed conflict approach and more from a 
criminal and law enforcement strategy.  Such a shift would connect 
NATO cyber defense against cyber terrorism with cyber crime 
strategies, triggering questions about how strongly NATO should 
support international law on cybercrime (specifically the 
Convention on Cybercrime) given doubts about its effectiveness.  
More generally, how much NATO should be engaged in criminal 
and law enforcement activities in the cyber realm is an issue when 
NATO is, first and foremost, a collective defense organization. 
 
 
3. Law and the cyber defense approach: Arguing about lex 
ferenda 
 
As described above, the perceived problems afflicting the 
cyber threat approach have fed into support for the cyber defense 
approach—the “all hazards” strategy to defend cyber infrastructure 
and systems from attacks regardless of source or intent.  NATO 
experiences cyber intrusions perpetrated by both foreign 
governments and cyber criminal organizations, often using the 
same techniques (e.g., malware-infested emails).  Foremost, 
NATO needs to defend against this kind of threat no matter 
whether a state or non-state actor is responsible.  Thus, classifying 
such attacks as espionage or crime is secondary to deterring or 
mitigating such attacks and creating resilience against successful 
infiltrations.  Being fundamentally distinct in policy terms, the 
                                                
38 For ratification status of these instruments, see United Nations Treaty 
Collection, Text and Status of the United Nations Conventions on Terrorism, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/DB.aspx?path=DB/studies/page2_en.xml. 
39 See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National 
Defense University (May 23, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university. 
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cyber defense approach generates legal issues different from those 
the cyber threat approach implicates.  
 Generally, the type of policy measures associated with 
strengthening cyber defense tend to trigger questions about, or 
tensions between, these measures and existing legal rules.  This 
pattern stimulates debates about what the law should be (lex 
ferenda) to support more robust cyber defense rather than how 
existing law (lex lata) should be applied to categorized cyber 
threats.  In other words, the cyber defense approach generally 
supports changing law, where necessary, to reflect the challenges 
presented by cyber threats.  But, again, these changes seek to 
bolster defensive strategies to prevent attacks and build resilience 
rather than to make legacy rules in the reactive cyber threat 
approach more specific to cyber threats.  Opposition to these 
changes is often embedded in fundamental principles of 
international and national law, which pits support for these 
principles against claims that cyber defense requires new rules or 
new applications of existing principles.   
 Three strategies to strengthen cyber defenses illustrate this 
dynamic.  Strong cyber defense requires “situational awareness,” 
meaning that (1) governments need to conduct more surveillance 
of information systems to understand the pattern and nature of 
cyber threats in circulation; and (2) state and non-state actors must 
share more information more frequently in order to heighten the 
public and private sectors’ understanding of threats and abilities to 
defend against them.  However, advocates of civil liberties, such as 
the right to privacy, tend to oppose on constitutional and 
international human rights grounds proposals to increase 
governmental authority to conduct electronic surveillance40 and 
increase information sharing between governments and non-
governmental entities.41  
                                                
40 See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l U.S., 133 S. Ct. 1138, 185 L. Ed. 2d. 264 
(2013) (Supreme Court decision rejecting on standing grounds a challenge by 
Amnesty International and others against the constitutionality of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act). 
41 See, e.g., Michelle Richardson, CISPA: A Legislative Threat to Privacy and 
Civilian Control of the Internet, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Apr. 4, 
2013), http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/cispa-
explainer-1-what-information-can-be-shared (critical privacy analysis of a 
legislative proposal in Congress that seeks to increase information sharing). 
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 A second example involves the debate over protecting 
critical infrastructure owned and operated by the private sector. 
The strategy of improving cyber defenses requires encouraging or 
mandating that the private sector improve its cybersecurity 
practices, especially when private-sector enterprises control or 
manage critical cyber infrastructure, critical infrastructure operated 
through Internet applications, or critical infrastructure dependent 
on the Internet to function.  This requirement brings the question of 
regulating the private sector for cybersecurity purposes into play, 
and, as the United States has experienced, political disagreements 
about such regulation have led to stalemate in the U.S. federal 
legislature.42  As with proposals for improving situational 
awareness, this fight is marked by disagreements about the 
appropriate scope of governmental power and legal authority to 
defend against cyber threats.  International law does not contain 
any rules or instruments on protecting critical infrastructure in the 
cyber context, so the legal tensions arise from national legal 
systems. 
 The third example focuses on proposals for cyber defense 
to be active rather than just passive.  What “active defense” means 
is part of the debate about cyber defenses, and the concept means 
different things to different people.  Generally, “active” defenses 
are distinguished from “passive” defenses in that “active” 
measures extend beyond a defender’s own information systems to 
identify, track, probe, infiltrate, or retaliate against the source of a 
cyber intrusion.  Included in discussions about active defenses are 
tactics such as “trace back,” “hack back,” surveillance for 
“situational awareness,” and “counter-strike.”  Debates about 
active defenses include arguments that such defenses deployed by 
private entities could create problems under national criminal laws.  
Active defenses could also generate worries that such defensive 
activities could violate principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention in international law.  
 NATO’s emphasis on cyber defense overlaps in important 
ways with the thrust of the cyber defense approach.  Table 1 lists 
                                                
42 Michael S. Schmidt & Nicole Perlroth, Obama Order Gives Firms 
Cyberthreat Information, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2013, at A16 (reporting on the 
issuance by President Obama on an executive order on improving cybersecurity 
for critical infrastructure as an alternative to Congress’ failure to pass legislation 
addressing this issue). 
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strategies often associated with improving cyber defenses and 
describes aspects of NATO’s efforts that reflect these strategies.  
This overlap does not mean NATO’s activities embrace more 
controversial issues implicated by the cyber defense approach, 
such as pursuing more intrusive government surveillance, more 
regulation of private-sector critical infrastructure, and more 
“forward-leaning” active defenses.  However, because these 
controversies are alive in NATO members and beyond, they will 
affect NATO cyber defense efforts by, at the very least, raising 
questions about what NATO does.  For example, will NATO 
members’ sensitivities about sovereignty keep NATO cyber 
defense activities completely passive and reactive even as cyber 
threats expand in scope, intensity, and sophistication?  How will 
strengthening NATO cyber defense deal with differences within 
the Alliance about the privacy and other civil liberties in light of 
the cyber threat?  What impact will U.S. and EU debates about 
improving private-sector cybersecurity have on NATO cyber 
defense activities? 
 
Table 1. NATO and the Cyber Defense Approach 
Cyber Defense Strategy NATO Cyber Defense Efforts 
Defend against any type of 
cyber attack 
• Strengthen cyber defenses of NATO systems 
against all kinds of cyber  attacks (e.g., NCIRC) 
Expand information 
collection, retention, 
sharing, and analysis 
• Improve information collection, analysis, and 
sharing 
• Better consultation, early warning, and 
situational awareness 
• Greater use of “open source” intelligence for 
cyber defense 
Extend reach of cyber 
defense activities 
• Cover NATO military wing and NATO civilian 
agencies 
• Improve NATO member cyber defenses 
• Work with the private sector in NATO members 
on cyber defense 
• Cooperate with non-NATO countries on cyber 
defense 
• Set requirements for non-NATO contributing 
nations in crisis management mission 
Move from “passive” to 
more “active” measures 
• NATO rapid response teams 
• NATO “penetration” testing of its systems 
• NATO awareness of technical, policy, and legal 
debates about more “active” defenses 
Integrate cyber defense 
with other defense 
planning 
• Integration of cyber defense into NATO Defence 
Planning Process 
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4. Law and the cyber technology approach: Harnessing cyber 
capabilities 
 
The cyber technology approach holds that the key to 
cybersecurity is development of full-spectrum technological 
capabilities to detect, deter, and defeat cyber threats.  This focus on 
capabilities rejects both the reactive categorization of the cyber 
threat approach and the emphasis on defense in the cyber defense 
approach.  Further, the cyber technology approach believes that the 
other two approaches are, in fact, dependent on technological 
capabilities more than on policy prescriptions and legal principles.  
For example, as described above, the cyber threat approach makes 
attribution critical to assigning accountability under each threat 
category, which constitutes a dilemma for this approach given the 
difficulty of attribution in cyberspace.  According to the cyber 
technology approach, the only way to improve attribution is 
through better, more powerful technological capabilities, not 
through policy or legal maneuvering.  Similarly, the ability to 
defend against cyber threats through an “all hazards” strategy 
requires cutting-edge technological capabilities to prevent, 
monitor, detect, respond, and recover from cyber intrusions.  
Moving from passive to active defenses also requires technological 
prowess to achieve defensive objectives and minimize policy or 
legal issues active defenses might raise.  
 The strategic objective of strengthening cybersecurity 
through technology means law has different functions under this 
approach, namely facilitating development of full-spectrum cyber 
capabilities (e.g., through research and development programs and 
cybersecurity workforce enhancement efforts) and regulating the 
use of such capabilities.  The development of more powerful and 
versatile full-spectrum capabilities will put power into the hands of 
government actors, and policy and legal issues will arise 
concerning how such power is exercised.  These issues can arise in 
different contexts, including the risks of secrecy in using powerful 
cyber technologies for law enforcement, intelligence, and military 
purposes; constitutional tensions between executive and legislative 
prerogatives in national security; and balance of power dynamics 
in international relations.  On these issues, international law either 
does not exist (e.g., on developing new cyber capabilities, 
regulating secrecy, or managing constitutional tensions) or is 
perceived to be weak (e.g., controlling balance of power politics).  
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 As with the other approaches, the cyber technology 
approach generates questions for NATO’s cyber defense strategy.  
As the description of NCIRC above indicates, NATO cyber 
defense requires operational capabilities, but, at the present time, 
NATO members are not sharing their most advanced technologies 
with NATO.  How can NATO keep its defensive capabilities 
relevant when offensive cyber means and methods continue to 
advance?  Can NATO’s cyber defense efforts be cutting-edge 
without developing offensive capabilities? 
 Further, if NATO deployed more advanced technologies, 
the level of secrecy about NATO cyber defense activities would 
likely increase.  How would such heightened secrecy affect NATO 
and NATO members?  Would more secrecy on cyber defense in 
NATO generate backlash within constituencies in NATO members 
or beyond?  Similarly, having access to more powerful 
technological capabilities could elevate NATO’s role in the 
cybersecurity dilemma emerging among the great powers in 
international politics, especially as between the United States and 
China.  Will equipping NATO will more full-spectrum capabilities 
fuel the “cyber arms race” that is already underway?  
 
 
C. Cybersecurity Policy Shifting: Legal Implications and 
Challenges for NATO43 
 
In addition to identifying the cyber threat, defense, and 
technology approaches as distinct policy pathways with different 
legal implications for cybersecurity, analyzing whether policy 
preferences are shifting in this realm is important, and, if so, what 
consequences flow from such a shift.  Our symposium panel 
discussed a potential shift in policy away from the cyber threat 
approach toward the cyber technology approach (Figure 5).  
Although the cyber threat approach remains part of the mix, 
problems with it have encouraged more policy interest in 
improving cyber defenses.  But, as described above, a cyber 
defense emphasis produces awareness of the limitations of 
defensive strategies and the attractiveness of developing full-
spectrum capabilities—thus suggesting an increasing interest in a 
                                                
43 In addition to Fidler’s Symposium presentation, this section draws on 
Pregent’s presentation on “Cyber Operations and Collective Self-Defense.” 
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capabilities focus.  Such a shift has implications for the role of law 
in cybersecurity because, as Figure 5 depicts, a shift from the cyber 
threat approach, with its dense legal texture, to the cyber 
technology approach, with its emphasis on capabilities, involves a 
move from a strategy grounded in well-traveled legal categories 
and concepts, to one premised more on the exercise of material 
power in cyberspace.  
 
 
Figure 5. Policy Shifts and NATO Cyber Defense 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Concerning the three categories and the potential policy 
shifting described above, NATO finds itself in a difficult situation 
that, under current NATO practices, will be hard to escape.  In 
terms of the cyber threat, defense, and technology approaches, 
NATO reflects behavior that puts the Alliance at a disadvantage. 
NATO tends to be conservative in terms of legal issues, meaning 
that the Alliance does not promise to be a fruitful forum for 
adapting or revising legacy rules to reflect the particular challenges 
cyber poses.  
 Similarly, with NATO operating on the basis of consensus, 
the Alliance’s decision-making processes might have difficulty 
handling governance questions created by the cyber defense 
approach, such as how “active” should NATO cyber defense be.  
Operationally, NATO cyber defense appears more static and 
reactive than active in orientation—a situation that could lead 
NATO cyber defense to become a cyber “Maginot line” rather than 
an effective defensive strategy.  It is not clear whether NATO 
members could reach consensus on what more active cyber 
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defense activities would be permissible under international legal 
principles on sovereignty and non-intervention.   
 As noted earlier, NATO functions with the capabilities its 
members make available to it, meaning that NATO’s technological 
capabilities in cyber might not reach cutting-edge status, leaving 
NATO cyber defense behind the global technological curve in 
cyberspace.  This problem is exacerbated if policy makers in 
leading powers, such as the United States and China, are placing 
more reliance on developing, deploying, and using full-spectrum 
cyber technological capabilities because of the perceived pitfalls of 
other approaches and the mounting geopolitical competition now 
affecting cyberspace.  
 NATO members are also extraordinarily sensitive to the 
Alliance having any offensive cyber capabilities or even discussing 
the need to think about the value of cyber capabilities and 
operations in missions NATO might undertake (as NATO has done 
with other technological developments affecting its military 
missions).44  The North Atlantic Council has not discussed, let 
alone authorized, the development of offensive capabilities, 
doctrine, or rules of engagement in the cyber realm.45  Whether 
NATO members could agree on what offensive cyber operations 
international law would permit is also not clear, especially in light 
of difficulties cyber presents to the international law on armed 
conflict revealed by the Tallinn Manual and other analyses.46  
 Events outside the specific context of NATO cyber defense 
might also adversely affect NATO cooperation.  For example, in 
June 2013, negative European reactions to the disclosure of a 
                                                
44 For proposals for how NATO could address offensive cyber operations, see 
Healey & Bochoven, supra note 8, at 8 (recommending that NATO should 
consider coordination of NATO members’ offensive cyber operations and 
“creating a group modeled on NATO’s existing Nuclear Planning Group, to 
consider offensive cyber policy”). 
45 NATO’s standing rules of engagement (ROE) might theoretically provide a 
basis for NATO offensive cyber operations under the ROE for information 
operations, but reliance on such ROE for offensive cyber operations is very 
unlikely given existing NATO sensitivities about offensive cyber issues. On 
NATO ROE generally, see NATO, NATO LEGAL DESKBOOK 254–62. (2d. ed., 
2010). 
46 NATO’s reluctance to address offensive cyber operations does not mean that 
the law of armed conflict prohibits such operations generally or in specific 
contexts where such operations might be militarily advantageous or ethically 
preferable.   
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secret U.S. surveillance program targeting cyber activities of 
foreign nationals, code-named PRISM, reflected new trans-
Atlantic tensions on government surveillance in cyberspace, its 
implications for privacy and other civil liberties, and the potential 
for European-American cooperation on cybersecurity.  The 
Washington Post reported that “[t]he discontent from Europe 
pointed to the breadth of fallout from the affair and to the potential 
for fresh strains between the United States and allies wary of 
American intrusiveness.”47  Whatever the long-term impact of this 
political fallout, the short-term consequences will likely not create 
more willingness among NATO members to become more 
ambitious with NATO cyber defense. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In its sixty-four year history, NATO has been at the center 
of national security challenges faced by members of the Alliance, 
whether the challenge involved confronting Soviet military power 
in Europe, expanding its collective defense strategy in the post-
Cold War period, responding to humanitarian crises, or 
participating in efforts to address international terrorism. NATO’s 
cyber defense strategy means that the Alliance has started to deal 
with yet another security threat, spurred in particular by the 
Estonia cyber crisis.  However, despite the progress NATO has 
made with its operational capabilities through NCIRC and its 
decision-making processes on cyber defense issues, NATO is not, 
at present, at the center of cybersecurity thinking taking place 
within the policy circles in NATO members, especially the United 
States.  The more NATO lags behind in cybersecurity policy and 
law, the more the Alliance will be stuck in a reactive mode—a 
situation that will reduce NATO’s ability to be a more constructive 
platform for cybersecurity both within the Alliance and between 
NATO and non-NATO countries.  NATO could proactively play a 
more significant role in global cybersecurity but only if NATO 
members empower NATO to lead rather than just trail behind. 
                                                
47 Michael Birnbaum, Merkel, Other European Leaders Raise Concerns on U.S. 
Surveillance, WASH. POST (June 10, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/merkel-other-european-leaders-raise-concerns-on-us-surveillance/2013/ 
06/10/305eddda-d1da-11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.html. 
